By Boris Gorbachev,
special for NuclearNo.com,
3 July 2003

Chernobyl Accident: the Principal Cause

Supplemented material about the principal cause of Chernobyl accident

Gorbachev B.I. - "Ukrytiye" Intersectional Science&Technology Center of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Translated by Victor Ouskin, Citizens` Center on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

17 years since the staff of the 4th block of Chernobyl nuclear power plant first "missed" the beginning of uncontrolled chain reaction in the reactor and then "was too late" to turn on the emergency protection. As a result the consequences of the world most severe nuclear accident that happened at Chernobyl nuclear power plant are not yet disentangled. But this was direct, purely technological cause of the accident that turned out to be the immediate effect of its main cause which was not of technological, but of political nature. Without it there would be no Chernobyl accident. However, this is dissembled or neglected by many who come from Minenergo, from its nomenclature, in particular.

Nuclear power plant and RBMK reactor

According to the program of development of atomic engineering adopted in the USSR in the 60s nuclear power plants were to be built in densely populated regions. Design of these plants did not provide for erection of ultrastrong sealed "dome" over the reactors or as scientists call it "containment". The reactor type was not of much importance, at that. Such "domes" are erected without fail over all reactors in the West and now in oriental countries, too. This requirement is mandatory since 1961 when through the fault of personnel a research reactor exploded; western countries faced the threat of terrorism at about the same time. We should remind that in those years in the USSR had neither the former nor the latter problem.

Erection of such "domes" doubled the cost of construction and, accordingly, of energy. But they radically solved two most important safety problems. First, these "domes" contained inside all hazardous radioactive substances and denied their discharge in case of incidental or deliberate explosion of the reactor. Second, they physically protected the reactor from external force impacts, such as a terrorists` attack, incidental fall of a heavy aircraft, explosion of conventional bombs, fall of not very large meteorites, etc. After erection of such "domes" terrorists "lost interest" to the nuclear power plants. The "dome" could not save in case of a nuclear war, but in this case it did not have much significance.

In the West nuclear power plants had water-moderated water-cooled reactors only. The USSR decided to equip the nuclear power plants with reactors of two types: water-moderated water-cooled (VVER-1000) and uranium-graphite reactors. The latter reactor type was chosen for its several advantages over the water-moderated water-cooled reactors. First, by that time the USSR atomic industry had developed manufacturing capabilities, gained much experience and technology to produce uranium-graphite reactors. Second, one block of a nuclear power plant with RBMK-type reactors could have unlimited power. This, of course made its control more complicated. Third, replacement of spent nuclear fuel for the fresh fuel did not require to shut down the reactor and, accordingly, to stop production of electric power. Ultimately, these and other advantages made electric power produced by nuclear power plants with RBMK-type reactors one third cheaper than the electric power produced by VVER-type reactors; economically it was more attractive.

But as an old saying goes "every merit has its demerit". All above mentioned advantages of reactors with RBMK-1000-type reactors made them more complicated to operate, more sensitive to observance of technological standards, more demanding to professional skill of operators, strict observance of safe operation regulations. In other words, they did allow "to take liberties ". The latter requirements were becoming principal for the power plants to be built in densely populated regions and with no "domes".

Being aware of this, a group of managers in the Ministry for Medium Machine-Building headed by the First Vice-Minister officially proposed to develop atomic engineering by the concept of atomic energopolises. In other words, they proposed to build groups of nuclear power plants in scarcely populated areas together with communities of maintenance personnel, and transfer the produced electric power by ultra-high-voltage lines. Such atomic engineering similar to the organization of atomic industry would provide high professionalism of the personnel, and in case of an unforeseeable accident minimize the loss of the state and population.

However, in government-level discussions supporters whose reasons were based mostly on high safety of reactors and relatively more expensive electric power from energopolises have not gained the upper hand. All nuclear power plant were built without "domes" in densely populated areas to bring the source of electric power closer to its users and make its cost cheaper. This political decision was not the cause of Chernobyl accident but it determined its catastrophic consequences.

Main cause or "everything depends on the cadre"

The basic cause that terminated in Chernobyl accident was another political decision, namely, the decision to turn over almost all nuclear power plants from the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building to the Ministry of Energy. Who made this idiotic proposal remains unknown. However, as a result, the atomic engineering of the whole country was actually separated from its raw materials base, from the personnel base, from the experience of running nuclear-hazardous enterprises, and professional nuclear engineers in the management of nuclear power plants were replaced by people who essentially did not belong to the atomic industry.

Since then our atomic engineering began its drift towards the world-largest nuclear accident. Indicative of this is (well known to atomic engineers and scientists) the increase of the number of accidents at nuclear power plants, sometimes with human losses, not always associated with overdosage. Therefore, an accident of Chernobyl type was prone to happen. If not in Chernobyl - then elsewhere.

The process of producing electric power from the energy of uranium nuclei belongs to hi-tech processes, i.e. "high technology". It is common knowledge that high production standards, and first of all exact observance of manufacturing the hi-tech product is among the principal constituents of these technologies. In our case this product is the electric power. That`s why (someone may consider it offensive) a manager in atomic industry should have a fairly high intellectual, high level of general cultural standards, profound scientific and practical knowledge, primarily in physics and technology of atomic reactors and not little professional experience of running them.

This necessity is explicitly put in recommendations for personnel departments at nuclear-hazardous facilities: "Personnel is to be selected with university or physical engineering education with knowledge of nuclear processes, radiation physics, human and environmental safety ". One can hardly be more exact.

Obviously, even the best electric-power specialists from hydro and thermal electric power stations do not meet these requirements; they have no basic knowledge, practical skills and production cultural standards necessary to manage atomic engineering, let alone atomic industry. It is not a secret that this cannot be taught at the so called "accelerated refresher course", such a course can give only the general idea of the work in atomic industry and some information about novelties. To try to climb to managerial positions having general ideas only is absolute nonsense.

"Everything depends on the cadre!" - a popular expression said in the thirties by the "great leader of the world proletariat" - objectively reflects the role, as is put in the 90s, of "human factor" in every sphere of human activities. Difficult to disagree. Hence automatically follows that, accordingly, "everything depends on ignorant cadre ".....

Liquidator veterans told that on the 29th of April 1986, i.e. three days after the Chernobyl accident the Ministry of Energy issued a "very interesting" order of the then minister of energy of the USSR A.I. Mayorets. By that order the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was to put into operation the first, second and third blocks shut down because of the accident by the 6th of May 1986, and the accident at the 4th block was to be liquidated and the block put into normal operation by the 19th of May. A rare case when the minister in written and with his own hand acknowledged his own ignorance.

There was time when a part of workers of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building together with the nuclear power plants took up work with the Ministry of Energy. There they were received as "foreign", the nomenclature of the Ministry of Energy thought them to be "too clever" and "too independent". Therefore, many of them, unable to withstand unprofessional by atomic working standards moral and psychological situation asked to get back despite lower positions, smaller salary and fewer privileges. Half in jest the head of personnel department of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building answered them: "Drifters are not wanted ".

The Ministry of Energy was, of course, happy to have such a gift. This strengthened the political influence of the ministry in very high circles. It is even easier to understand it from purely human standpoint. It was extremely prestigious at that time to work at a nuclear power plant, let alone to manage such a plant. A salary at a nuclear power plant was much higher than at a thermal or hydro-electric station. For example, an ordinary employee of a nuclear power plant had about 300 rubles, and managers - even more, according to their position. Director`s salary was, of course, the highest. It amounted to the sum astounding for that time - 1100-1200 rubles! A little less than a member of Politbureau. In today`s money this is about 12 000 grivnas! Directors of thermal or hydro electric power station couldn`t even dream about such salaries

Material benefits - apartments, cars, furniture dachas, etc. - for workers of atomic engineering were much more ample than in any other industry. This abundance made the nomenclature flare up. To give all this away to "foreigners"? So, instead of filling the positions of rapidly erected nuclear power plants with professionally trained cadre, the Ministry of Energy began appointing "its own" people - specialists in turbines, steam, water preparation, electricity, mechanics, etc. to managerial and well paid positions in nuclear power plants.

That`s how it happened that Chernobyl nuclear power plant was the only plant where neither the director nor the chief engineer were specialists in atomic engineering. The former is said to be a good specialist in steam turbogenerators. Of interest is his characterization made by the vice chief engineer: "Director Bryukhanov... had no knowledge of reactors. For a long time he thought that reactors are simpler that turbines." This is understandable, the turbugenerators drone, high-pressure steam makes the rotors rotate at high speed, electric and magnetic fields intensively interact. Quite impressive. In a reactor there is nothing to rotate, only water murmurs, and control rods go to and fro... absolutely unimpressive.

The chief engineer is said to come to his position from the position of foreman of electrical shop. Like director, he had no professional atomic training and experience, but before his work at Chernobyl nuclear power plant he had gained great experience of connecting cow sheds and pigsties to regional electrical networks. Of interest is his characterization by his co-worker Ignatenko: "He had some personal drawbacks. He always fancied himself a director. Every time the director was away he took his office and managed as director. We knew about this trait of his character and decided to make him director of Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant". Unwillingly the author of this phrase demonstrated the essence of personnel policy of the Ministry of Energy - "our own" man wants to be a director of a nuclear power plant - let him be. Whether he meets the requirements of this position by his professional merits - this was unimportant. What was important that he was "our own" man, from the Ministry of Energy.

Vice chief engineer - a retired naval officer in charge of electrical engineering experiment during the tragic night of 26 April about 15 minutes after the explosion when the reactor ceased to exist resolutely demanded the operators to feed water into the non-existent reactor. This, in spite that two trainees whom he had sent to reconnoiter the central control room to have a look at the reactor (he did not go himself!), delivered him a message that the reactor is destroyed, that there is no roof, in the control room one can see the "night sky in gleams of fire ", that the reactor`s "lid" with twisted segments of process channels "slid into the reactor ", and "some glow is seen in it ". And among the three he was the most educated and professionally trained. Nice were the managing cadre at Chernobyl nuclear power plant!

Isn`t it but natural for such management to choose their employees "to match themselves". People who came to work at the nuclear plant were former foresters, fishermen, agronomists, miners etc. whom the so-called "accelerated refresher course" had turned into "specialists". As a result, according to veterans of Chernobyl plant by the moment of accident only the operators, i.e. those who controlled operation of atomic reactors on all four blocks had more or less decent professional level. Even they were morally "oppressed" by their not very cultured and professionally incompetent management.

Dominant at Chernobyl plant was nepotism and suppression of any criticism by administrative methods. This and putrid moral-psychological situation that reigned at the plant before the accident were described by journalist Kovalevskaya. Cite but four excerpts from her materials to make everything clear.

"Oh, Lord, how honestly people work at the construction site (the blocks to follow - author), and how hard is the moral situation at the station. As if I`ve come to take someone`s position. Careerism, struggle for a place, for a position ".

On plant management: "They call the workers to work honestly and with enthusiasm, while themselves... take Czech lavatory pans home from the hotel. At the hotel they place from their homes, take home from the hotel. The town is small, every blunder, every moral fall of an authority are immediately known. All this is discussed, rumors, gossip... even more so that the criticism was grossly oppressed ".

"Everyone is somebody`s friend or acquaintance. If one is criticized - all of them rush to protect him without trying to understand the subject ".

On cultural standards:

"Can you imagine - it was possible to see an operator sitting on the control board. The one with buttons, tumblers....

- How can it be?...

- That`s how it was. He just sat down. Sat down on the control board. No kidding".

Cultural standards impermissibly low for a nuclear-hazardous enterprise "...the plant workers warned the leaders of the country about the possibility of a serious catastrophe. Everyone, who dared do it was fired". These are materials of Chernobyl plant worker B. Rogozhkin who the night of the accident was shift manager.

"When the Central Committee of Ukraine received information based on materials of Pripyat municipal department of KGB about gross violations that caused leakage of radioactive substances before the 1986 accident, it was considered disinformation, as a result a penalty was imposed on KGB workers". This is from the recently declassified report made by general Yu. Petrov from Security Force of Ukraine at a closed conference in 1996.

I think this needs no comment.

According to veterans Chernobyl nuclear power plant was outstanding for its liberties and patriarchal village-type total lenience, provided one did not criticize the management. During long winter nights in Chernobyl the author listened to numerous stories on the subject and would not be surprised if someday it turns up that some plant employees would arrive at the working place tipsy, and could add more drinking together during night and evening shifts when the top management of the plant was absent. Some during night shifts could leave their working places and went by bikes to Pripyat for romantic dates with their "lady-love".

It was at that moment that I recalled my acquaintances who saw in the Ministry of Energy "classified" information about "drunk incidents" i.e. cases of drinking or finding a person drunk at his working place for all nuclear power plants of the ministry. Which plant was at the top of the list?..... Chernobyl, of course. And this is an objective indicator of moral and psychological situation, actual cultural production standard and professional attitude to work that dominated at the plant before the accident. It is common knowledge that all these factors are willy-nilly determined by the management.

It was at the turn of the 70s when the author first heard "there is some bedlam" at this Chernobyl plant from the employees of Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research who visited the plant to carry out exposure work. Their work was to visit different atomic facilities and they could objectively compare ways and customs at different sites. We laughed at the examples of "bedlam" and thought that those were upsetting mistakes, a so-called "disease of growth" which was soon to recover.

The other time the same was told by the members of the commission that investigated the Chernobyl accident. Their reserved interviews pointed out "poor knowledge of reactor physics" and their attitude to the reactors "as if it were some boiler". One should bear in mind that this was told at the time when they were reserved by the secrecy and propaganda guidelines.

In his jubilee interview patriarch of atomic industry (27 October 1999 he was exactly 100) one of closest associates of I.V. Kurchatov, chief designer of RBMK Nikolai A. Dollezhal unconstrained anymore by propaganda guidelines openly commented on the cause of the accident: "...the personnel of Chernobyl plant was awful, unsuccessfully we wrote to all levels of higher authorities about negligent operation of the plant. On the tragic day in the course of another experiment the reactor was driven into cavitation mode. Then they tried to extinguish in vain, tried to use sand in vain - as a result radioactive spray spread over the entire world".

Another patriarch of atomic industry Boris V. Brokhovich, director of well known "Mayak" Combine, industrialist with more that 40 years` experience, winner of numerous governmental prizes and awards for successful work in atomic engineering appeals to his experience to say the same: "This (Chernobyl accident - author) can be explained only by irresponsibility and inability to understand the danger by the entire staff - from the minister ... to ordinary engineer ".

One more patriarch of atomic industry, legendary minister of Medium Machine-Building Yefim P. Slavsky having reviewed the investigation materials characterized the causes of Chernobyl accident in even sharper: "Fools in the field, fools in the ministry ". Veterans of atomic industry know very well that Yefim Slavsky was not an exemplary diplomat and told unvarnished truth boldly. Not infrequently very sharply.

No one knew and knows the properties of uranium-graphite reactors better than these patriarchs, to say nothing of all nomenclature of the Ministry of Energy, judging by the statements the latter made in mass media.

Conclusions of "competent organs"

Immediately after the Chernobyl accident different institutions formed five commissions and groups to investigate its circumstances and causes. However little is known that immediately after Chernobyl accident there worked the sixth group formed by "competent organs". Not attracting much attention of the public they carried out their own independent investigation of circumstances and causes of Chernobyl accident employing their own unique information potentialities. In the first days they interviewed and interrogated 48 persons and made photocopies of many documents related to the accident. At that time the "competent organs" enjoyed respect even of mobsters; the Chernobyl plant people could hardly think of lying to them. This makes the conclusions of "organs" especially interesting for scientists.

However, these conclusions were classified as "top secret" and a very small circle could get familiar with them. It was quite recently that the Security Service of Ukraine decided to declassify a part of the Chernobyl materials that were kept in archives. Even though these materials are not secret any longer, they are still actually inaccessible for the broad circles of researchers. Nevertheless, persistence of the author and kindness of general Yu. V. Petrov of Security Service of Ukraine made possible for the author to get acquainted with these materials in detail.

It turns out that preliminary conclusions have been made as soon as by the 4th of May 1986, final conclusions - by the 11th May that same year. For the sake of brevity cite but two excerpts from these unique documents immediately related to the subject of the article.

"...the general cause of the accident was low cultural standards of nuclear power plant employees. The question is not about skill, but the working standards, internal discipline and the feeling of responsibility " (document ╣ 29 of 7 May 1986).

"The explosion was due to several gross violations of work regulations, process and inobservance of safety conditions in operation of reactor of the 4th block of the nuclear power " (document ╣ 31 of 11 May 1986).

This was the final conclusion of the "competent organs". They never returned to this issue.

It is apparent that their conclusion is in agreement with the conclusions of this article. Yet, there is a "small" difference. The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine reached these conclusions only 15 years after the accident, struggling through thick fog of disinformation and, sometimes, deliberate lie of interested persons about atomic science and its scientists. Meanwhile it took the "competent organs " two weeks to find actual causes of Chernobyl accident.

Main lesson

Today it is obvious: the fact that the accident happened at the 4th block is quite incidental. Considering the cadre in the top management of the plant and "liberties" in handling the plant, the accident could happen on the 3rd, the 2nd and the 1st block. It is this reason that makes the author restrain from naming people immediately involved in these tragic event that were the natural result of unprofessional work of the entire system of the Ministry of energy in atomic engineering. They couldn`t work otherwise. The reasons are above.

Of course the decision to transfer nuclear power plants to the Ministry of Energy was a time bomb for all nuclear power plants. But the fact that such a non-standard accident happened at Chernobyl was natural. It was here that basic foundations of professionalism were violated most blatantly. And veterans of Chernobyl nuclear power plants should not be offended by sharp remarks of the patriarchs of atomic industry. They were speaking about the general policy and general situation in the Ministry of Energy, and not about individuals. There were competent atomic specialists in the Ministry of Energy, but they were few and it was not them who determined the situation in the ministry.

Yes, having fulfilled professionally incompetent instructions of their management formally, legally it was the 5th shift of the 4th block that turned to be guilty in "losing control over a nuclear-hazardous facility", and paid their lives and health. Yet, judging by the essence of the matter, and by the highest standards the main cause that terminated in Chernobyl accident was professional incompetence of the plant management and high authorities of the Ministry of Energy.

Atomic engineering is a delicate high technology instrument to produce electric power and nuclear hazardous production. Therefore, if the atomic energy is managed at any level not by professionally trained atomic specialists, but by people who are "his own" for some managing ignoramus it is worth not to build the new power plants but close those that have been built. It is not reasonable for the society to risk hundreds of billions dollars to gain public benefit of several million. This is the first and main lesson of Chernobyl accident.

Your opinion (comments to the article)?

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?°???‚???? ???µ???? ?‚???????° ?????µ?????‚?°???»???µ?‚ ?‚???»?????? "?????»???‚???·?????????°????????" ???µ???????? http://accidont.ru/ ?‡???‚?°?µ?? ???? ?????»???????? ???????????µ?‚?»?µ??????. ???»?°?????°?? ???????‡?????°: ?????????‚?‹, ???????????‚?????????????°???€???µ ???µ?°???‚????. ?????±???‡???°??: ???µ?????°?‡???????? ?·?° ?????»???‚????, ???µ ???????????°???‰???µ ?µ???? ???°?±???‚?‹.

Authors version is too politized www.accidont.ru readin till full understandin comes main: idiots have constructed reactor secondary: reactors crew didnt understand the principles of its work

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